The USS Thresher (SSN-593), which sank 60 years ago this April, was the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine to be lost at sea. Amid the public shock over the tragedy, the U.S. Navy grappled for an answer as to what went wrong. Even today, rival theories seek to explain the mystery.

In 1941, the United States suddenly found itself in a war that would span a third of the Earth's surface - the Pacific Ocean. They faced an implacable enemy with imperial ambitions, and the Pacific Fleet - or at least, what wasn't on the muddy bottom of Pearl Harbor - was built in part on Great War relics.

Four years later, the United States Pacific Fleet had more modern combat ships than all the other navies of the world combined. The United States, as Admiral Yamamoto warned, had fired up its enormous industrial base to a war footing faster than anyone thought possible, and we drowned the Empire of Japan in steel - and atomic flame.

Today there is another Asian power with Pacific Ocean ambitions, and we have some problems that didn't exist in 1941. //

The primary problem, according to Eaglen, is that China may well win dominance in the Pacific without firing a shot. And, as is always the case, the problem has a lot to do with logistics.

“If they know if this ever got beyond competition to something with the use of violence, we don’t have that capacity to rapidly repair and resupply forward in Asia, and it’s a really long way home to sail and fly things. You see how Beijing’s starting to win without fighting,” she concluded. //

America does have some advantages in the Pacific. Our undersea fleet is the most advanced in the world, and as the Germans learned as early as the Great War, submarines are a great force multiplier.

Currently, the Navy has more admirals than ships.

John Ʌ Konrad V
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The U.S. Navy has more Admirals than ships, yet it can’t keep the Red Sea open or deliver new ships on time.

So, how do Navy Admirals spend their time? World travel to 4-star hotels!

Here's their Nov conference list

P.S. The list for Army & Air Force Generals is even longer.
8:08 AM · Nov 8, 2024. //

It's a good thing that he is not a creature of the Navy hierarchy and is not beholden to the military-industrial complex for his next gig. I can't be convinced that either of those groups cares much about winning wars and protecting America. //

NavyVet
7 hours ago
There is a clear pattern in President-elect Trump's cabinet picks: they have proven successful in competitive real-world endeavors, based on merit.

This is a sharp contrast to the last four years, where power was given for pure political reasons, with nary a real success among them.

Because these are not isolated producers swimming in a sea of political incompetence, they will be a force to be reckoned with. //

NavyVet DukeUSA
7 hours ago
My point has nothing to do with the Navy per se, what I am observing is the overall theme of his cabinet picks: proven winners, willing to approach government like a business, rather than corrupt political wrangling. //

Douglas Proudfoot
8 hours ago
There is no accountability for failure in the flag officer ranks of the US Military. The British famously executed failed Admiral John Byng in 1757, to, as Voltaire put it in "Candide," encourage the other admirals. Britania ruled the waves for about 180 years after the execution. In the US, a flag officer's failure on the battlefield or in weapons procurement should, at the very least, lead to retirement after a reduction in grade, at the lower grade. The president should see this done as Commander in Chief. If not, the Senate can refuse to confirm retirement as a 3 or 4 star flag officer. Right now, morale is low. Nobody respects senior leadership, because they take no responsibility even for obvious failure. This has to change. Rewarding failure means we'll get a lot more of it.

Me=USAF Systems Analyst Officer 1972-1976, Meritorious Service Medal 1976. //

anon-x1lc
7 hours ago
Congress's lack of a proper budget since Pres Bush have done great harm to the Navy. Continuing resolutions screw everything up. Can't budget for 5 and 10 years out for repair and refit. Plus the DEI cluster fark didn't help. FOcus on social engineering instead of competent leadership also screws things up. Cpt allowing a Starlink Sat antenna on her ship tels me the leadership is FUBAR and incompetent. If the command doesn't notice an extra antenna bolted on the side of the superstructure, they are complete idiots.

The Montana-class battleships were the pinnacle of U.S. battleship design during World War II, intended to surpass the Iowa-class with unmatched firepower and armor. Featuring twelve 16-inch guns and enhanced protection, these ships were designed to counter Japan's Yamato-class battleships and bolster U.S. naval strength in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

China is, to be sure, a nation with big ambitions. They want a big, ocean-spanning navy like a wolf wants a sheep, and they seem to be determined to get one. But they are going to have to step up their game. The country has been beset by quality problems in everything from shipbuilding to buildings to electric scooters, cars, and cell phones. Until they figure out their quality problems and learn to develop tech of their own that is on a par with Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the United States, we will continue to see incidents like this laughable failure of their vaunted new killer submarine - that sank alongside the pier. //

anon-6879
6 hours ago
As a retired Navy O-6, I would say Ward needs to get his stuff a little more together. (1) The picture in the article is of a ballistic missile sub, not an attack boat. (2) The attack sub was under construction, which means it sank while in the hands of the shipyard, probably without navy crew. Industrial accidents occur---we've had some bad ones when ships were in the yard, including fires and floodings. In the early '60's the attack carrier Constellation had a major fire while under construction which delayed its completion for more than a year. Did that man we didn't have an effective navy at the time? (3) The Chinese navy is much more than a "frigate navy." Their first supercarrier is at sea, and that gives them three afloat, with one carrier recently at sea in the South China Sea and off the Philippines with it's battlegroup. (Admittedly, they have a lot to learn about carrier ops.) However, they're projected to have five or six carriers by the end of the decade. That's as many as we have in Pacific. The Type 55 cruiser or destroyer leader (depending on how you classify it) is being built in numbers (Eight active, eight building.) Meanwhile, we're decommissioning our 30+ year old Ticonderoga Aegis cruisers without replacement. Their Type 52D missile destroyer is quite comparable to our Burke Class or the British Type 45 in size and capability; it's been built in numbers (25 active) and production continues. (4) The USN would love to have some frigates---we're struggling to build the new Constellation Class after the fiasco of the Littoral Combat Ships which were supposed to replace our once robust---now non-existent---frigate force. (5) The Chinese do have a good replenishment capability---their task groups operate in the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic, and the North Pacific with replenishment ships in company. They're also acquiring foreign ports for use by their deployed squadrons. (Meanwhile, our carrier strike group in the mid-east is without a replenishment oiler because it went aground and is out of service while the navy is struggling to get a replacement on scene.) Our replenishment capability is a mere shadow of what it was in the cold war due to "Peace Dividend" budget cuts in last three decades. (6) In any fast developing conflict over Taiwan or dispute of the South China Sea, China would have home court advantage and a massive advantage in numbers over what our 7th Fleet could muster. The truth is, in the last three decades the Chines navy has made massive strides in numbers, the quality of it's equipment and its operational expertise at sea. Meanwhile, the USN is undeniability in decline: our numbers are diminishing and in recent years we've had a rash of collisions and groundings not to mention poor material readiness of our ships due to industrial maintenance deficiencies. In summary, we underestimate the PLAN at our peril.

China is, to be sure, a nation with big ambitions. They want a big, ocean-spanning navy like a wolf wants a sheep, and they seem to be determined to get one. But they are going to have to step up their game. The country has been beset by quality problems in everything from shipbuilding to buildings to electric scooters, cars, and cell phones. Until they figure out their quality problems and learn to develop tech of their own that is on a par with Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the United States, we will continue to see incidents like this laughable failure of their vaunted new killer submarine - that sank alongside the pier. //

Alpinealan
13 hours ago
USS Thresher, SSN-593, was the first sub in its class. It failed during deep sea tests on April 10, 1963 with the loss of all on board. Building these boats requires the utmost in quality control...something the slave labor force at China's shipyards are probably not able to deliver.

SSN674 Alpinealan
13 hours ago
The Thresher incident led to significant changes in the design, construction, and operation of submarines. The lessons learned from the Thresher incident have had a profound impact on submarine safety and have helped to prevent future tragedies. These lessons continue to be applied to the design, construction, and operation of submarines today. //

anon-1tw9 Alpinealan
13 hours ago
This.
A simple brazed pipe joint behind a reactor control panel failed, causing the reactor to scram (shut down), She slowly sank stern first because the emergency ballast blow system had a fatal flaw in it.
m

Point is, all took was one bad pipe joint.

My dad served on Plunger, her sister. They were tasked with developing tactics for this new breed of killer, and killers they would have been, because they were just that far advanced. The Soviets would have never stood a chance.

SSN674 anon-1tw9
13 hours ago
Also, a couple critical factors contributing to the tragedy was the presence of moisture in the high-pressure air system. This moisture condensed and froze within the lines leading to the main ballast tanks, preventing them from being blown to the surface. Additionally, when the reactor scrammed, the main steam supply lines to the engine room automatically shut down. This prevented the crew from using ship's power to drive the submarine to the surface.

Despite the crew's efforts and constant communication with the Thresher during sea trials, there was ultimately little that could be done to prevent the disaster.

They fixed the moisture issue and changed stopped automatically closing of the main steam supply values after the incident. //

anon-1tw9 SSN674
13 hours ago edited
Yup. They had a small debiris screen on the end of the air piping feeding the tanks, and it would ice up because of the moisture.

I forgot which sub almost killed themselves finding that out that problem in the investigation. They almost went down too, or maybe just a harrowing experience, I can’t remember. //

DonH-Texas
15 hours ago
Did they order their sonar equipment from the same company that supplied the Hezbollah pagers?

Laocoön of Troy DonH-Texas
15 hours ago
By the way...look at the hull planform of their nukes. All kinds of sharp angles guarenteed to make more noise than my oldest's speakers set to eleventy. I'm told that their boats are god-awful noisy. Not a great survival strategy at sea.

The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), providing a legal foundation for privateering. This concept remains an option under U.S. law. //

Engaging privateers to target the Russian ghost fleet could also have the secondary effect of incentivizing international shippers to register under the U.S. flag. The prospect of U.S. Navy protection against potential retaliation by Russia or other adversarial powers would be a significant draw for these companies. Currently, U.S.-flagged vessels are entitled to the protection of the U.S. Navy, providing a security assurance that can be crucial in unstable maritime environments.

This shift could bolster the U.S. merchant marine fleet, enhance national security, and ensure better compliance with international laws and sanctions. Moreover, a larger U.S.-flagged fleet would create a more robust logistical network — absolutely vital in deterring the PRC across the vast expanse of the Pacific.

"When my team and I went to South Korea, we were floored at the level of digitization and real-time monitoring of shipbuilding progress, with readily available information down to individual pieces of stock materials," Del Toro said.

"Their top executives could tell us to the day when ships would be delivered," he said. That's a stark difference from the US, which is facing problems with its shipbuilding capacity, labor availability, and resources. //

During his recent Sea Air Space speech, Del Toro further praised South Korea and commended Japan, saying both Pacific allies could build high-quality ships on time, on budget, and often at a fraction of the cost. //

Maj. Jeffrey L. Seavy, a retired US Marine Corps officer, wrote for the US Naval Institute that China had roughly 47% of the global market on shipbuilding, the most of any country, with South Korea coming in second at about 29% and Japan in third at about 17%. He said the US had "a relative insignificant capacity at 0.13%," referencing numbers from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

The United States Navy's continued investment in aircraft carriers, notably the Ford-class, amidst evolving global military dynamics and emerging threats, particularly from anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems developed by adversaries like China, poses strategic and financial challenges. //

Of course, these aircraft carrier arguments are eerily similar to the ones made by proponents of battleships 80 years ago.

Back then, it was the battleship that was the centerpiece of US Navy power projection and the aircraft carriers that were viewed as strange ancillary elements in the fleet. //

First, it will need more Virginia-class attack submarines. Second, it will need to develop arsenals of sophisticated underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV) as well as advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Third, the Navy needs to invest in its own hypersonic weapons capacity. Fourth, Navy resources need to be put into directed-energy weapons (DEW).

All these other expenditures, such as trying to replace the 10 Nimitz-class carriers with 10 Ford-class carriers when the Nimitz-class still has decades of service left, is one such example of wastefulness on the part of the Navy.