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The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), providing a legal foundation for privateering. This concept remains an option under U.S. law. //
Engaging privateers to target the Russian ghost fleet could also have the secondary effect of incentivizing international shippers to register under the U.S. flag. The prospect of U.S. Navy protection against potential retaliation by Russia or other adversarial powers would be a significant draw for these companies. Currently, U.S.-flagged vessels are entitled to the protection of the U.S. Navy, providing a security assurance that can be crucial in unstable maritime environments.
This shift could bolster the U.S. merchant marine fleet, enhance national security, and ensure better compliance with international laws and sanctions. Moreover, a larger U.S.-flagged fleet would create a more robust logistical network — absolutely vital in deterring the PRC across the vast expanse of the Pacific.
"When my team and I went to South Korea, we were floored at the level of digitization and real-time monitoring of shipbuilding progress, with readily available information down to individual pieces of stock materials," Del Toro said.
"Their top executives could tell us to the day when ships would be delivered," he said. That's a stark difference from the US, which is facing problems with its shipbuilding capacity, labor availability, and resources. //
During his recent Sea Air Space speech, Del Toro further praised South Korea and commended Japan, saying both Pacific allies could build high-quality ships on time, on budget, and often at a fraction of the cost. //
Maj. Jeffrey L. Seavy, a retired US Marine Corps officer, wrote for the US Naval Institute that China had roughly 47% of the global market on shipbuilding, the most of any country, with South Korea coming in second at about 29% and Japan in third at about 17%. He said the US had "a relative insignificant capacity at 0.13%," referencing numbers from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
The United States Navy's continued investment in aircraft carriers, notably the Ford-class, amidst evolving global military dynamics and emerging threats, particularly from anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems developed by adversaries like China, poses strategic and financial challenges. //
Of course, these aircraft carrier arguments are eerily similar to the ones made by proponents of battleships 80 years ago.
Back then, it was the battleship that was the centerpiece of US Navy power projection and the aircraft carriers that were viewed as strange ancillary elements in the fleet. //
First, it will need more Virginia-class attack submarines. Second, it will need to develop arsenals of sophisticated underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV) as well as advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Third, the Navy needs to invest in its own hypersonic weapons capacity. Fourth, Navy resources need to be put into directed-energy weapons (DEW).
All these other expenditures, such as trying to replace the 10 Nimitz-class carriers with 10 Ford-class carriers when the Nimitz-class still has decades of service left, is one such example of wastefulness on the part of the Navy.