William Burr and Leopoldo Nuti examine the Kennedy Administration's efforts to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy, part of a secret deal with Nikita Khrushchev to end the Cuban missile crisis. //

Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) at Cigli air base in Turkey, 1963. There a squadron of 15 Jupiters was deployed becoming operational in March 1962. //

Kissinger’s finding that “almost everyone” among senior Italian government officials suspected a US-Soviet “agreement” on the Jupiters was not the only time such suspicions surfaced. In the days and weeks after the crisis began to dissipate, mid-level State Department officials discussed rumors that President Kennedy had favored a deal and had a “keen interest” in getting the Jupiters out. In the months after the crisis, McNamara and Rusk tried to batten down suspicions of a deal, testifying before Congress that there had been no such thing. But doubts persisted. Senator John Stennis (D-Ms), among other Senators, was convinced there had been a trade.[v]

It was essential for the Kennedy administration to implement the secret deal and make good on a commitment to the Soviet leadership, but executing it had its complexities. While Khrushchev focused mainly on the Jupiters in Turkey, withdrawing the IRBMs from Italy was also a US goal. Under a coherent policy, the US could not leave Jupiters anywhere on NATO territory, although this made the diplomacy more complicated. And the withdrawal of the Jupiters could not be completely secret, because it had to be carefully and delicately coordinated with Italy and Turkey, whose governments had signed agreements accepting the missiles. Both were NATO allies, and Washington could not ride roughshod over them.

To minimize suspicions of a US-Soviet deal, the reasoning for the Jupiter withdrawals would be carefully explained to Italian, Turkish, and other NATO interlocuters.