MCAS was added on at the end as a high-tech Band-Aid to mitigate an unacceptable issue within the underlying MAX design.

Incompatible requirements had the MAX engineering team figuring out how to retrofit a large, next-generation engine (with fuel efficiency to compete with the Airbus A320neo) onto a legacy 737 airframe from 1968 without room for the new engine in the original mounting location. The team moved the engine mounting location forward and higher to fit the larger engine. The new mounting location was analyzed to cause an undesirable, increased tendency for this aircraft design to pitch upward (which can cause a stall in extreme situations).

Instead of pursuing other structural design options such as redesigning the landing gear, the team turned to the engineering elixir of automation. Sound engineering was outsourced to an autonomous MCAS computer with the authority to push the plane downward as it saw fit — tragically so in the 2018-2019 crashes.

An engineering team would not follow this course of action of its own accord. The legacy airframe was an issue; the new mounting location was an issue; inserting automation into the loop to smooth over these issues is unfathomable. Further investigation through a criminal trial should determine whether a trade study (engineering team’s comparative review of design options — a best practice) was conducted and, if so, who decided the outcome. //

Boeing is guilty of fraudulent behavior. But nothing about MCAS or individual engineer communications is the root cause. The grieving families and the public deserve to know who at Boeing directed the 737 MAX competitive strategy fundamentals and to see that party brought to justice.