Americans imagine that inside every Chinese person an American is struggling to get out. But China is different, so different that the categories of Western political science are meaningless. China will not change because we think it should, or because we want it to, or because we exhort the Chinese to embrace the benefits of democracy and free markets. If it changes, it will do so very slowly. We shall have to deal with China as it is, and has been for thousands of years. We can demonstrate the superiority of our system with economic growth, technological innovation, and military strength—although we haven’t done so of late. We can show that our ways are better—when we stick to our ways—and set an example. But we can’t change China by preaching to the Chinese.

China’s unique geographic conditions required from antiquity a centralized tax system to fund infrastructure and a centralized bureaucracy to administer it. It never persuaded the peoples it absorbed into the Chinese empire to speak a common language or to confess the same religion. Ethnicity has no role in Chinese statehood. //

When Chinese dynasties failed, either because of internal corruption or natural disaster, bandit rebellions replaced them. China has no hereditary aristocracy, unlike Europe, because the new dynasty levels the ground that preceded it. The Communist Party of China arose as a bandit rebellion in China’s classic historical pattern, and governs as a new incarnation of China’s ancient Mandarin caste. In place of the old Mandarin exam based on Chinese classics, China now has the gaokao, the fearsome university entrance exam. The biggest difference between today’s Communists and the old Mandarins is that the CCP is larger and more comprehensive, with nearly 100 million members.

China’s Emperor is not a revered demigod on the Japanese model, or an anointed sovereign claiming divine right, but simply the one ruler whose job it is to prevent all the other would-be rulers from killing each other. He is Lucky Luciano, the capo di capi whose function is to keep the peace among the underbosses who fear him more than they fear each other. And, to extend the metaphor, the CCP is Marxist in the same way the Mafia is Catholic; both organizations take their ideology seriously, although its practical significance is limited. The Chinese people therefore don’t love their emperor, any more than rank-and-file Mafia soldiers love the capo. They say resignedly, “Without an emperor, we’d kill each other.” And that is just what they have done in the tragic periods when imperial dynasties collapsed.